NATO is in Fear of What, Wetting Its Pants?
It’s Liberation Day in NATO, if Europe shakes off American dominance.
Somehow the NATO members of Europe have been convinced that Trump’s threat to leave the organization is a “woo, woo, lions and tigers and bears” moment.
It is none of those things.
Firstly, it’s unlikely that our president, cornered as he is by a much-tougher-than-expected Iran, would find this particular moment advantageous to jump to his bone-spurred feet and leave. He has too many cabinet members yet to throw under the bus, while he attempts to powder the wig of respectability.
On the European side, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has amply identified the route to independence for NATO, having successfully untethered Canada from the more difficult matter of location, location, location. That may be critical in the real-estate game, but a pain in the ass when Big Brother shares a 5,525 mile common border. Carney seems to have successfully turned Canada’s back on America, looking toward Europe for weaponry and China for trade.
Looking toward Europe for weaponry is no small deal.
When Carney chose Europe rather than the U.S. for weapons procurement, it wasn’t ideological, but strategic. Buying outside America reduces dependence on Washington’s approval mechanisms, such as export controls and congressional oversight but, more importantly, it avoids exposure to policy swings tied to either Trump or future administrations.
U.S. weaponry systems have increasingly come with operational restrictions on software upgrades and US only maintenance restrictions. As an example, the Swedish Grippen is smaller, lighter, and with only a single engine, its reduced size and weight allow it a high degree of maneuverability and a take-off distance of only 500 meters, a strategic advantage in geographically adverse runways.
European sourcing would also enable maintenance and political control across multiple NATO partners, which is particularly relevant in a world of fragile alliances. This integration provides manufacturing capability, technology transfer, and joint development without restraint. It builds European capability that aligns with NATO goals, but is not U.S.-centric, so interoperability is maintained without tying everything to variable U.S. doctrine or platforms.
Weighing the tradeoffs requires looking forward, toward changing power structures.
I have long felt that the American Century is tapering off. I expect the future will find China dominant, but sharing a tripartite power structure with America and Europe. Russia no longer matters, except as a nuclear power. Its $2.5 trillion GDP is dwarfed by Europe’s $37 trillion.
Militarily, that leaves these three areas of world power, one of which depends upon a NATO with or without the United States. If I was in charge of NATO, I would much prefer the latter.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance between 32 member states, 30 of which are in Europe and two in North America. Its US member has dominated the organization since its inception by President Harry Truman in 1949. We were the last major power standing at the end of WWII and, to our credit, created the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.
Yet, power structures and political alliances change over time.
The time, it seems to me, is now for Europe to step up its military capability for the changes yet to come. There will likely be no better time than the present. Russia has its hands full in Ukraine, the United States is quite likely over its head in Iran, and China is taking the long view, as it has done for centuries.
It’s Europe’s moment to build a NATO with or without the US, if it chooses to take it.